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EDUCATION LAW-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDI­
VIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AND SECTION 1983: 
ARE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AN AVAILABLE AND ApPROPRI­
ATE REMEDY? 
INTRODUCTION 
Andrew was diagnosed with autism at birth.1 Until age three 
he received educational services through an independent program, 
at which time he was integrated into the special education program 
within the Greenfield, Massachusetts public school system. His 
parents were concerned that the school's staff was not adequately 
trained to meet their son's needs. Consequently, they sought to 
have his individualized education program ("IEP")2 revised to re­
turn him to his prior placement or to another off-site program out­
of-state. Negotiations and discussions took place between the par­
ents and school officials, but the school district maintained An­
drew's placement in the Greenfield program. Dissatisfied with this 
decision, the parents requested a hearing before the Massachusetts 
Board of Special Education Appeals. 
The hearing officer ruled that the IEP calling for integration 
into the Greenfield program was appropriate, but ordered the 
school district to improve their staff-training and home-school coor­
dination. In the face of this disagreement over where and by whom 
Andrew's services would be provided, Andrew's parents filed a 
complaint in federal district court.3 In addition to requesting an 
off-site placement, the plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to 
compensatory damages under § 19834 for the emotional distress 
they suffered as a result of the school district's violation of the Indi­
viduals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").5 
The District Court of Massachusetts ruled that a § 1983 com­
pensatory damages claim for violation of IDEA could not be sus­
1. The facts presented here are from Andrew S. v. School Committee of Green­
field, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1999). 
2. See infra note 90. 
3. Andrew S., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 239. 
4. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); see infra Part I.A. 
5. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). Title 20 of the U.S. Code requires the Depart­
ment of Education to develop and publish IDEA regulations. 34 C.F.R. § 300 (1999); 
see infra Part I.B (discussing IDEA). Although the designation "IDEA" did not take 
effect until 1990, this term will be used throughout this Note for the sake of consistency. 
301 

302 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:301 
tained on the facts of this case.6 If, however, Andrew and his family 
had lived in New York, for example, where compensatory damages 
under § 1983 are an available remedy for violation of IDEA,? An­
drew and his parents might have been awarded the damages that 
they sought. 
The premise of a suit like this8 is that a school district has failed 
to provide a child with a free appropriate public education 
("FAPE") in violation of IDEA.9 Most likely, the families, as 
plaintiffs, will name multiple defendants, including the teachers, 
principal, special education supervisor and superintendent, school 
district, school board, and the municipality.1° The plaintiffs are also 
likely to bring additional claims under constitutional and state tort 
law,11 as well as a variety of federal statutes.12 These additional 
6. Andrew S., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 239, 244-46 (ruling on a matter of first impression 
and holding that "[g]arden variety statutory violations" could not form the basis of a 
compensatory damages suit brought under § 1983 for violation of IDEA, but arguably 
leaving the door open for egregious violations). 
7. See, e.g., Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d 513, 515-16 
(S.D.N;Y. 1999) (holding that nothing in the IDEA precludes a damages claim and 
stating that "it is entirely possible that [the student's] earning capacity since graduation 
was diminished, and that such diminution may only be remediable via damages"). 
8. Among parents who choose to sue, Andrew's case is considered typical. These 
cases generally revolve around the sufficiency of the child's IEP, where the disagree­
ment may concern the nature or extent of services or the way in which services are 
provided. Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in 
Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REv. 465, 526 (2002) (citing James R. Newcomer 
& Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 6 
ExcEP. CHILD. 469, 478 (1999) ("identifying placement of child as the primary issue in 
63% of [a] representative sample [that included] almost half of all litigated cases be­
tween 1975 and 1995")). 
9. IDEA guarantees a FAPE to all children with disabilities and, to fulfill that 
promise, imposes a set of procedural safeguards, including the right to bring a civil 
action in federal court. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1487. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the 
purpose of IDEA). 
10. E.g., Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th CiT. 
1996) (naming the board of education, superintendent of schools, principal, and teacher 
as defendants in the suit). 
11. Constitution-based claims might include allegations of equal protection and 
substantive or procedural due process deprivations; state law claims might include alle­
gations of assault, negligence, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. E.g., M.H. 
v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., 169 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D. Conn. 2001). 
12. E.g., id. (bringing claims under § 1983 for violation of § 504, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Constitution, and claims for state tort law dam­
ages incurred through the school district's alleged negligence). Generally, these suits 
include claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§ 504), 29 U.S.c. 
§ 794 (2000). The first federal civil rights legislation for all persons with disabilities, 
§ 504 states, "No otherwise qualified individual with. a disability ... shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
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claims may provide equally various forms of relief.B If, however, 
the plaintiffs seek compensatory damagesI4 under § 1983 for the al­
leged violation of IDEA, it is unclear what remedies will be availa­
ble to them. The question of whether a violation of IDEA could 
make school boards liable for compensatory damages under § 1983 
is an unsettled, yet much visited issue in the courtS.15 Most circuits 
of the United States Courts of Appeal have weighed in on this issue 
resulting in an array of confusing and contrary positions.16 
Part I of this Note outlines § 1983 and IDEA, highlighting their 
relevant provisions. Part II examines § 1415(1) of IDEA, the sec­
tion which most influences the interaction of IDEA and § 1983. It 
also summarizes the divergent views reflected in current decisions 
among the circuits. Finally, Part III explores the availability of 
Federal financial assistance ...." Id. Although § 504 extends protection beyond public 
schools, school districts fall within its scope because they receive federal funds. Among 
its provisions, § 504 includes a definition of FAPE. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1). Parents 
have used this FAPE provision, among others, to obtain certain programs and services 
for individual disabled students. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMER. 
ICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 445 (5th ed. 2001). Students who qualify for protection 
under IDEA, however, should generally seek a remedy under it rather than relying on 
§ 504 because IDEA's protections are more specific. In other words, students and par­
ents should use § 504 only for claims that cannot be resolved under IDEA. DIXIE 
SNOW HUEFNER, GElTING COMFORTABLE WITH SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 80 (2000). 
In addition, these suits often include claims under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 12101 (2000), a federal nondiscrimination statute that extends to private sector em­
ployment and public sector accommodations. Public school students generally sue 
under Title II of the ADA because it requires government agencies to make reasonable 
accommodations for disabled people. HUEFNER, supra at 53. However, it seems likely 
that to the extent that IDEA and § 504 provide more specific rights and standards, 
students with disabilities will rely on them more often than on the ADA. Id. at 59. 
13. For example, in ADA suits courts have ordered relief ranging from injunc­
tions to damages and civil penalties. In addition, courts often award attorney's fees to 
parties who prevail in these suits. Furthermore, courts have steadily held that monetary 
damages are available under § 504 and the ADA, although there is a difference of opin­
ion as to whether proof of gross misjudgment or bad faith is required. See Perry A. 
Zirkel, Special Education's "Top Twenty" Cases/Concepts from 1997 to the Present, 151 
EDUC. L. REP. 1, n.36 (2001). 
14. E.g., Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) (where parents 
sought compensatory damages due to alleged misuse of blanket wrapping treatment on 
their daughter). Compensatory damages are monetary compensation "awarded to a 
person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm sustained by him." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979). These might include damages for pain and suffer­
ing, emotional distress, or loss of earning power. 
15. Andrew S. v. Sch. Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 241 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
16. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing plaintiff to pursue 
§ 1983 compensatory damages claims for IDEA violations). Contra Padilla v. Sch. Dist. 
No.1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding § 1983 unavailable); Sellers v. Sch. 
Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (same). 
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compensatory damages under § 1983 for violation of IDEA. It be­
gins by arguing that § 1415(1) fails to clearly authorize an award of 
compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983. It also discusses 
whether compensatory damages, even if available, are appropriate 
by exploring additional arguments in favor of and against awarding 
§ 1983 damages for violation of IDEA. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 1983 AND IDEA 
As mentioned, parents of children with disabilities may rely on 
§ 1983 and IDEA together to bring a claim. Determining whether 
such a claim is permissible requires an examination of both statutes. 
A. Section 1983 
Conceived as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 198317 ini­
tially provided remedies for civil rights violations against African 
Americans after the Civil War.18 Today, it is a widely used means 
of enforcing a broad range of rights,19 providing the basis of most 
litigation against local governments and local officers for constitu­
tional violations. 20 Section 1983 provides that any person who, act­
ing under color of law, deprives another of rights secured by federal 
law may be held liable to the injured party.21 
Because § 1983 creates remedies and not substantive rights,22 
the cause of action must be for violation of rights secured by "the 
17. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
18. Reconstruction and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments were accompanied by a reign of terror and violence against blacks 
throughout the South. In response to Senate investigations, Congress adopted this leg­
islation. In considering the Civil Rights Act, members of Congress discussed "the fail­
ure of state police and state courts to adequately control the problem." Section 1 of the 
Act, now § 1983, empowers the federal government to act through the federal court to 
prevent and redress violations of federal rights. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL Ju­
RISDICTION 426 (2d ed. 1994). 
19. Id. at 424-29; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1985). 
20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 491. See generally Daniel J. McDonald, A 
Primer on 42 U.S.c. § 1983, UTAH B.J. (May 1999). 
21. § 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni­
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
22. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1979) (stat­
ing that a person cannot claim a violation of § 1983 because it is only a vehicle for 
vindicating rights secured by the Constitution and federal law). 
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Constitution and laws." In early cases, constitutional rights formed 
the basis of most § 1983 claims. The Supreme Court later deter­
mined, however, that § 1983 also provides claimants with a cause of 
action for violations of their federal statutory rights.23 Conse­
quently, a parent of a student with disabilities may bring a statute­
based claim under § 1983 by alleging a violation of the rights guar­
anteed by IDEA,24 and a constitutional claim alleging, for instance, 
a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection 
Clause.25 
In conjunction with making both constitutional and statutory 
§ 1983 claims available, the Supreme Court placed significant limits 
on them. To begin with, the Court has held that § 1983 is available 
in a statutory context only where the federal statute creates an en­
forceable right.26 In other words, it is the violation of rights, not 
laws, which gives rise to § 1983 actions.27 Once it is determined 
23. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980) (holding that § 1983 provides 
claimants with a cause of action for violation of federal statutory rights provided for in 
the Social Security Act). 
24. See, e.g., Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
IDEA does create enforceable rights). 
25. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (involving 
a suit against a school for sexual harassment). For a discussion of the nature of statu­
tory-based and Constitution-based § 1983 claims, see Michael A. Zwibelman, Com­
ment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465 
(1998). 
26. The Supreme Court has held that these rights may be explicitly provided for 
in the statute, such as in IDEA, or implied from the statute, such as in the context of 
Title IX. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979) (holding that Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 create 
individual rights because the statutes are phrased "with an unmistakable focus on the 
benefited class"). 
27. In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that "unless Congress 
'speak[s] with a clear voice,' and manifests an 'unambiguous' intent to create individu­
ally enforceable rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for enforcement by 
§ 1983." 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2273, 2278 (2002) (holding that FERPA's confidentiality provi­
sions create no private right of action enforceable under § 1983) (quoting Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17,31 (1981) (holding that the Develop­
mentally Disabled Assistance and the Bill of Rights Act did not confer an enforceable 
right». Therefore, violation of a statute by itself does not guarantee that a plaintiff may 
bring suit under § 1983. Compare Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 522 (1990) 
(allowing § 1983 suit by health care providers to enforce the reimbursement provision 
of the Medicaid Act on the ground that it conferred specific monetary entitlements 
upon the plaintiffs), and Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 
U.S. 418,430 (1987) (holding that the rent ceiling provision of the Public Housing Act, 
which conferred a benefit "focusing on the individual family and its income," did create 
an enforceable right), with Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997) (holding that 
a Social Security Act provision, which focused on "the aggregate services provided by 
the State" rather than "the needs of any particular person," did not confer rights en­
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that a statute confers a private right of action, it is presumptively 
enforceable by § 1983.28 However, the Court has held that a state 
may rebut this presumption by showing that Congress "specifically 
foreclosed a remedy under § 1983."29 For example, a court could 
find that "Congress shut the door to private enforcement ... ex­
pressly, through 'specific evidence from the statute itself.' "30 In ad­
dition, a court could find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 action 
"impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that 
is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983."31 Fur­
thermore, in cases where the § 1983 claim is based on violation of 
constitutional rights that are virtually identical to the rights con­
ferred by the statute, a court may determine that the § 1983 action 
is precluded because Congress intended that the statute provide the 
exclusive remedy.32 Therefore, even though IDEA expressly con­
fers a private right of action, a school district's violation of IDEA is 
not automatically actionable under § 1983.33 
In addition to bringing suits based on both "the Constitution 
and laws," plaintiffs may also bring claims against a variety of per­
sons. The Supreme Court has held that states and state agencies 
are not persons for purposes of § 1983.34 As such, plaintiffs may 
force able through § 1983}, and Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (ruling that the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act did not confer on its beneficiaries a private 
right enforceable under § 1983 because of a lack of congressional intent to create such a 
remedy). 
28. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (holding 
that "absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the 
power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant 
to a federal statute"). 
29. Gonzaga Univ. 122 S.Ct. at 2276 n.4 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1004 n.9 (1984}). 
30. [d. (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 423 (1987)}. 
31. [d. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)}. The Court has 
found a comprehensive administrative scheme precluding enforceability under § 1983 in 
two cases: Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984), in which the Court noted that 
IDEA provided for "carefully tailored" administrative proceedings followed by federal 
judicial review, and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981), in which the Court noted that the two environmental pro­
tection statutes cited had "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" which pre­
cluded any finding of implied legislative authorization of additional remedies. 
32. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1008-09 (noting that a statutory remedy precludes Consti­
tution-based § 1983 ~laims that are virtually identical to the statutory claims if Congress 
intends such a result). 
33. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing whether IDEA's comprehensive remedial 
scheme precludes enforcement under § 1983). 
34. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that neither 
the State nor its officials in their official capacities could be sued for damages in state 
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not sue state educational agencies.35 One exception exists where a 
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief may sue state 'officials.36 On the 
other hand, the Court has determined that municipalities and mu­
nicipal governmental institutions are persons for purposes of 
§ 1983.37 Consequently, plaintiffs may sue local school districts for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.38 If, however, a local 
school district is considered to be "an arm of the State" rather than 
a separate political subdivision, it may be immune from suit.39 
Despite finding that municipalities are generally liable, the 
Court has limited the potential liability. It has stated that munici­
palities may only be sued for their own unconstitutional or illegal 
policies or customs; they cannot be sued for the acts of their of­
ficers, agents, or employees based upon a theory of vicarious liabil­
ity.40 Thus, since the plaintiff has to prove that the municipality 
itself is somehow liable, suing a school district under § 1983 is com­
plicated. To establish liability, plaintiffs must show that the munici­
pality, through policy or custom, caused the deprivation of a federal 
right.41 Although the Court has not specifically addressed how to 
establish the existence of a policy or custom sufficient to impose 
§ 1983 liability, five bases for claims have emerged.42 These are: (1) 
actions by a municipal legislative body, such as a city council;43 (2) 
court under § 1983); Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars § 1983 suits against state governments in federal court). 
35. E.g., L.c. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 188 F, Supp. 2d 1330 (D. Utah 2002) 
(holding that the Utah State Office of Education and the Utah State Board of Educa­
tion, and their officials, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment). 
36. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.lO. 
37. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that a municipal­
ity could be classified as a person under § 1983). 
38. Id. at 690. 
39. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) 
(holding that state's Eleventh Amendment immunity was not available to school board 
and outlining the factors to be used in determining whether a governmental entity is an 
arm of the state); e.g., Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
school district was not an arm of the state in Connecticut and was therefore not immune 
from suit). 
40. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

[T]he language of § 1983 ... compels the conclusion that Congress did not 

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official munic­

ipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we con­

clude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under 

§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 

Id. 
41. Id. at 691-70. 
42. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 447. 
43. E.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding that 
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actions by agencies or boards that exercise authority delegated by 
the municipal legislative body, such as school boards;44 (3) actions 
by those with final decision-making authority in the municipality, 
such as superintendents or principals;45 (4) a policy of inadequate 
training or supervision,46 such as a school district's failure to train 
its employees to prevent sexual abuse;47 and (5) a custom, such as a 
practice that despite not being official policy, is widespread and 
pervasive.48 In response to being sued, municipalities may not rely 
on good faith or qualified immunity as a defense.49 Moreover, mu­
nicipalities may not assert state law immunities.50 They are, how-
a city council's cancellation of a concert in violation of the First Amendment is an act of 
official government policy, constituting proper basis for compensatory damages under 
§ 1983 but not punitive damages). 
44. E.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding that regulations adopted by the Depart­
ment of Social Services and the Board of Education "unquestionably involver 1official 
policy"). 
45. E.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736-37 (1989) (noting that 
the identification of individuals whose actions represent the official policy of the local 
government is a question to be determined by the trial judge prior to trial); Pembaur v. 
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 (1986) (holding that an order by the county prose­
cutor to break down a doctor's door constituted the city's official policy); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 450. In making the determination whether an official 
has final decision-making authority, the crucial question is "whether under state or local 
law, including relevant customs or practices, the person has policy-making authority for 
the city." Id. 
46. E.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (explaining that dem­
onstrating a policy of inadequate training requires proof of "deliberate indifference" to 
the rights of persons for § 1983 municipal liability). For a discussion of the difficulty of 
establishing school board liability in this respect, see Gail Paulus Sorenson, School Dis­
trict Liability for Federal Civil Rights Violations Under Section 1983, 76 EDUC. L. REp. 
313 (1992). 
47. E.g., Thelma O. v. Bd. of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that 
a school district can be liable for failing to train its employees to prevent or terminate 
sexual abuse). In addition, plaintiffs could establish that a supervisor's inaction is suffi­
cient to constitute a policy or custom that caused the injury. See William D. Valente, 
School District and Official Liability for Teacher Sexual Abuse of Students Under 42 
U.S.c. § 1983,57 EDUC. L. REp. 645 (1990). 
48. The Supreme Court has not specified this method of establishing municipal 
liability, but other courts have. E.g., Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 
646 (8th Cir. 1990) ("For the District to be held liable on the basis of custom, there must 
have been a pattern of 'persistent and widespread' unconstitutional practices which be­
came so 'permanent and well settled' as to have the effect and force of law." (citing 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691». 
49. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,638 (1980) (holding that firing a 
police chief without due process in good faith did not protect the municipality from 
liability under § 1983). 
50. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (finding that state sovereign immunity 
does not extend to municipalities in a state court § 1983 action); see also Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 707, 726-29 (1999) (reaffirming that municipalities do not enjoy the 
sovereign immunity of the State). 
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ever, immune to claims for punitive damages.51 
In addition to suing municipalities, plaintiffs may also sue indi­
viduals.52 Often, these defendants are named in both their official 
and individual capacities.53 A claim against state or local officials in 
their official capacities is essentially a suit against the entity itself.54 
Therefore, like states, state officials cannot be sued in their official 
capacities because of Eleventh Amendment immunity.55 However, 
a claim against state or local officials in their individual or personal 
capacities is a suit against specific persons and may result in mone­
tary recovery directly from those persons.56 
To establish personal liability, plaintiffs must "show that the 
official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a 
federal righ1."57 Defendants sued in this capacity "may assert per­
sonal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on 
existing law" or qualified immunity. 58 Qualified immunity protects 
public employees from liability "insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known. "59 Therefore, a parent of a 
student with disabilities could establish liability by showing that a 
school employee ignored clearly established rights of which a rea­
sonable person would have known.6o 
51. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that 
it would be unfair to punish a city's taxpayers because of city officials' wrongdoing). 
52. This is important because the Eleventh Amendment (in the state context) and 
the difficulty of proving that official policy caused the violative conduct (in the munici­
pal context) often protect governmental entities from liability. CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 18, at 459. 
53. E.g., Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 301 F. 3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (nam­
ing defendant individually and in his official capacity). 
54. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985) (finding that a suit against de­
fendant in an official capacity results in liability against the entity only). 
55. See supra note 34. 
56. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (outlining distinctions between personal 
capacity claims and official capacity claims). 
57. Id. at 25 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985». 
58. Id. 
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that presidential aides 
are entitled only to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity). See also Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,315 (1975) (stating that qualified, good faith immunity extends 
to school board members and school administrators in a damages suit under § 1983). 
60. Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1299 
n.9, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that the director of student services violated a clearly 
established right under IDEA when she agreed to transfer the student without an eval­
uation based on a telephone call from the parent, therefore subjecting the director to 
individual liability for damages); Doe. v. Withers, 20 IDELR 422 (D.W. Va. 1993) 
(awarding $15,000 in damages in a § 1983 suit against a history teacher who refused to 
implement a student's IEP). 
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Moreover, individual officials may also be liable under a theory 
of supervisory liability.61 As in the context of municipal liability, 
supervisory liability is not based upon a theory of respondeat supe­
rior, but on a supervisor's acts or omissions.62 In order to prevail 
against supervisory officials in this context, plaintiffs generally must 
show direct participation or inaction based on a failure to remedy, 
gross negligence, or deliberate indifference.63 Consequently, par­
ents may bring a claim against a special education program director 
based on supervisory liability even if that person had no contact 
with their child. However, defendants sued in these individual or 
personal capacity suits may also rely on qualified or good faith im­
munity as a defense.64 
As delineated in § 1983, defendants may be held liable in "an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re­
dress."65 Thus, courts may award injunctive, declaratory, and mon­
etary relief,66 as well as attorney's fees. 67 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has determined that punitive damages may also be 
61. Eg., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding 
that police officials failed to prevent officers from committing acts in violation of plain­
tiffs' rights and are therefore proper defendants in § 1983 action). For a discussion of 
the nature of supervisory liability in § 1983 claims, see Kit Kinports, The Buck Does 
Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147 
(1997). 
62. Eg., Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that "liability 
in this context is not premised on respondeat superior ... but on a recognition that 
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a 
causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict"). 
63. Eg., Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 
2001) (outlining circumstances under which supervisory liability may be found); Colon 
v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (establishing various standards allowable to 
establish supervisory liability including direct participation in wrongdoing, failure to 
remedy wrong after informed of it, grossly negligent supervision, creation of policy that 
led to violations, or deliberately indifferent failure to act on information about constitu­
tional violations). 
64. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987) (holding that government 
officials are provided with qualified immunity to shield them from civil damages liabil­
ity "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the 
rights that they are alleged to have violated"). 
65. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
66. For a discussion of § 1983 generally, and damage awards in particular, see 
Daniel J. Lynch, Note, Compensatory Damage Awards in Section 1983 Actions Based on 
Federal Statutory Violations, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1373 (1988). 
67. Attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b) (2000). It allows for the award of reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in cases brought under various federal civil rights 
laws, including § 1983. 
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available in § 1983 suits, but only in suits against individuals68 
where the official acted with a malicious intent or deliberate disre­
gard of the plaintiff's rights.69 
In all circumstances, the plaintiff bears the burden of establish­
ing causation by showing a direct link between the defendant's con­
duct and the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.70 Even if 
the plaintiff meets this burden, damages are not available for the 
deprivation of the right itself; a plaintiff can only recover compen­
satory damages for actual injuryJl Consequently, plaintiffs must 
plead actual injuries, such as medical and psychiatric expenses, lost 
earnings, and damages due to pain and suffering and emotional dis­
tress.72 Because the Court has stated that the purpose of damages 
awards is "to protect persons from injuries to particular interests," 
damage awards are shaped by the interest protected.?3 In addition, 
the level of damages awarded in § 1983 actions is determined ac­
cording to principles derived from the common law of tortsJ4 
Generally, § 1983 is a complex yet potentially powerful tool for 
plaintiffs. Part of its allure lies in the fact that bringing a § 1983 
claim in conjunction with a statute may allow plaintiffs to obtain 
damages and other relief not available for a claim based on the stat­
ute alone. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights. In­
stead, it provides a cause of action to enforce rights found 
elsewhere. In the context of special education, IDEA supplies 
those rights. 
B. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In the early 1970s, two federal district court cases heightened 
public awareness of the educational plight of disabled children.?5 In 
68. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 246 (1981) (holding that puni­
tive damages are not available in a suit against a municipality). 
69. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that punitive damages are 
available when the official's "conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, 
or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of 
others"). 
70. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 
71. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,307 (1986) (noting that a 
plaintiff can only recover compensatory damages for actual injury suffered as a result of 
the violative conduct). 
72. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (stating that "mental and emotional 
distress caused by denial of due process itself is compensable under § 1983"). 
73. Id. at 254. 
74. Id. at 258-59 (stating that compensation principles may be derived from tort 
Jaw). 
75. The cases are Mills v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 
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both cases, the courts found that public schools were denying chil­
dren with disabilities access to an education either by excluding 
them altogether, or by expelling them without giving parents notice 
or an opportunity for a hearing,76 Soon after these "landmark" de­
cisions, Congress investigated the status of children with disabilities 
and found that state educational systems were not fully meeting the 
special education needs of the more than eight million children with 
disabilities.77 Public school systems excluded more than one mil­
lion of these children, and many other children participated unsuc­
cessfully in regular school programs because their disabilities were 
undetected.78 Frequently, children who did receive an adequate ed­
ucation did so at significant distance from their home and at great 
expense to their parents.79 
Both bodies of Congress proposed legislation to address this 
demonstrated failure to meet the needs of children with disabili­
ties.80 This legislation, the precursor to IDEA, was entitled the Ed­
ucation for All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA"), 
sometimes referred to as P.L. (Public Law) 94-142.81 Signed into 
law in 1975, passage of the Act was a turning point in the education 
of children with disabilities. It offered significant federal funding to 
states for the direct aid of these students.82 In 1986, Congress 
866 (D.D.C. 1972), and Pennsylvania Ass'n ofRetarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. 
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (commonly referred to as "PARC"). At that time, school 
laws in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia allowed denial of entry to children 
whose IQ's were below seventy until the children reached age eight. Once they entered 
school, the schools dismissed many of these children because they could not learn how 
to read. The courts held that students with disabilities have a constitutional right to a 
free public education and outlined basic procedures school districts must follow before 
excluding them or placing the children in programs separate from regular education 
students. See ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 440. 
76. Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866; PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279. 
77. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
78. [d. § 1400(c)(2)(C) & (D). 
79. [d. § 1400(c)(2)(E). 
80. ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 444. 
81. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 788 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1487 (2000)). 
82. Unfortunately, this promise of funding has never come to fruition; the funds 
are "everywhere conceded to be inadequate to meet the expectations of the Act." 
HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 21. In the original legislation, Congress authorized funding 
to reach 40% of the national average per pupil expenditure. During the early years, the 
funding reached 12% of the national average, but in the 1980s, it dropped to approxi­
mately 8%. In fiscal year 1997 and 1998, it rose considerably, but never reached even 
its former level of 12%. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTIETH ANNUAL REpORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDU· 
CATION ACT III-43 (1998)). 
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passed one of the most important amendments, the Handicapped 
Children's Protection Act.83 Four years later, Congress renamed 
the statute the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, replac­
ing the term handicap with the term disability.84 In 1997, Congress 
added numerous and substantive amendments to IDEA.85 
1. How IDEA Works 
The overarching goal of IDEA is to guarantee that all children 
with disabilities86 have available to them a FAPE,87 which empha­
sizes special education88 and related services89 and is individual­
ized90 to meet each child's unique needs. In addition, IDEA 
83. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). This amendment is pivotal in deter­
mining whether compensatory damages are available under § 1983. See infra Part ILA 
(discussing the passage of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act). 
84. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101­
476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-51. 
85. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17,111 Stat. 37 (1997). Commonly referred to as IDEA '97, changes were aimed at 
increasing school readiness and graduation rates, raising outcome expectations, improv­
ing safety in schools, promoting partnerships with parents, and improving the profes­
sional skills of the teaching force. The amendments also expanded disciplinary 
provisions, which have generated much controversy. HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 25-27. 
86. To be eligible for IDEA services, students must be between the ages of three 
to twenty-one and fall into one of the following categories: specific learning disability; 
speech or language impairment; mental retardation; serious emotional disturbance; 
other health impairment; orthopedic impairment; hearing impairment; visual impair­
ment; autism; or traumatic brain injury. 20 U.S.c. § 1401(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000). The De­
partment of Education regulations also use all thirteen of these disability categories. 34 
c.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1) (2002). 
87. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
FAPE generally requires that the necessary special education and related services be 
personalized and of "some educational benefit." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,200-01 (1982). 
88. "The term 'special education' means specially designed instruction, at no cost 
to parents, that meets the unique needs of a child with a disability." § 1401(25) (2000). 
Not limited to traditional special education classes, it may include such things as one­
on-one tutoring, programs in residential facilities, and adapting the content, methodol­
ogy, or delivery of instruction. 34 C.F.R. § 3oo.26(b)(3). 
89. 20 U.S.c. § 1401(22) (2000). Related services include transportation or devel­
opmental, corrective, and other supportive services that are necessary to assist a child 
with a disability to benefit from special education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24. Because of the 
cost of these services, many of them, such as transportation, school health services, 
psychotherapy, and services in a residential setting are quite controversial. E.g., Irving 
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 895 (1984) (holding that clean intermittent cathe­
terization was a related service under IDEA). 
90. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d). The individualized education program (IEP) is central 
to IDEA because it helps to determine appropriate placement, measure progress, and 
facilitate communication between the school and the family. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A). A 
team, which includes special and regular educators, parents, a representative of the lo­
cal educational agency, and the student (where appropriate), generates and reviews 
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requires that local educational agencies place children in the least 
restrictive environment ("LRE")91 that will provide each child with 
an appropriate education. To achieve these goals, IDEA provides 
assistance to states, localities, and other educational agencies.92 
This assistance comes primarily in the form of funds to states with 
federally-approved plans.93 
In order to receive the funds, a state must demonstrate to the 
Secretary of Education that it has in effect a plan that ensures all 
children with disabilities have the right to a FAPE.94 Each state 
must also develop a plan for compliance with IDEA's other re­
quirements.95 These requirements begin on the local level with 
identification and evaluation of students,96 and parental participa­
tion in the development of an individualized education plan 
("IEP") for each student.97 Beyond this, educational agencies have 
to comply with the provisions of § 1415 that guarantee access to due 
process procedures for parents or guardians who wish to challenge 
a child's IEP.98 
2. The Safeguards of IDEA's Section 1415 
By creating § 1415's procedural safeguards, Congress provided 
protection that surpasses the minimal requirements of notice and 
an opportunity to respond.99 Section 1415(a) provides: "Any State 
... or local educational agency that receives assistance ... shall 
establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to 
IEPs at least annually. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The increased attention to measurable 
goals and outcomes under IDEA '97 may spawn increased litigation regarding IEP 
goals and progress. HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 164. 
91. 20 U.S.c. § 1412(a)(5). LRE refers to the setting closest to the regular educa­
tion classroom in which FAPE can be delivered, which may be but is not necessarily the 
regular education classroom. HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 257. 
92. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(1)(C). 
93. Id. § 1411. 
94. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
95. Id. at § 1412(a)(2). 
96. Id. at §1412(a)(3). This is often referred to as the "child find" provision. 
97. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); see also supra note 90 (discussing IEPs). 
98. 20 U.s.c. § 1415. 
99. The decisions in PARC and Mills influenced the development of these provi­
sions. Mills v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); PARC, 343 F. Supp. 
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In both cases, the courts held that formal written notice and a 
formal hearing were required before removing students with disabilities from school. 
See supra note 75 and accompanying text. All students are entitled to minimal proce­
dural due process before being suspended or expelled from school. Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that students must receive at least oral notice and if 
charges are challenged, an informal opportunity to give their side of the story). 
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ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaran­
teed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of [FAPE] 
by such agencies. "100 The section goes on to outline procedures 
that generally include: notice and an opportunity to participate in 
the development of the student's program; notification of the pro­
cedures to resolve conflicts and grievances; a fair and impartial 
hearing process; an opportunity for appeal and judicial review; and 
if necessary, an award of appropriate relief.101 Because courts may 
enforce § 1415's procedures, they are essential to ensuring that dis­
abled children receive the education statutorily guaranteed to them. 
In practical terms, § 1415 requires that a school notify parents 
of its procedural safeguards.102 Parents must also have the opportu­
nity to examine all of their child's records.103 In addition, they have 
the right to participate in meetings about the identification, evalua­
tion, placement, or provision of FAPE to their child, and to obtain 
an independent educational evaluation ("IEE").104 Schools must 
also provide written notice to parents within a reasonable time 
before they initiate or change the identification, evaluation, educa­
tional placement, or provision of FAPE to a child.105 Essentially, 
these provisions require schools to communicate frequently with 
parents and seek their consent in devising appropriate educational 
programs for for their children.106 
If a parent does not agree with the steps the school is taking, 
§ 1415 outlines a means to resolve disputes. Parents are entitled to 
initiate an impartial due process hearing whenever they have a 
complaint alleging a school district's noncompliance with IDEA.107 
Voluntary mediation provisions,108 as well as the right to file a com­
plaint with the state educational agency,109 are also included in 
IDEA to aid in the resolution of disputes. If parents choose the 
100. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(a). 
101. Id. § 1415(b); see also id. § 1415(d)(2) (outlining what must be included in a 
procedural safeguards notice available to parents). 
102. Id. § 1415(d). School personnel must provide parents with a full written ex­
planation of the safeguards on the following occasions: initial referral, each notification 
of an IEP meeting, reevaluation, and receipt of a request for a due process hearing. 
HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 172. 
103. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(b)(1). 
104. Id. 
105. /d. § 1415(b)(3). 
106. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(C); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.505 (2002) (outlining when 
informed parent consent is required). 
107. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(f) (2000). 
108. Id. § 1415(e). 
109. 34 C.F.R §§ 300.660-61; HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 181-83. 
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hearing option, an impartial hearing officer, who is neither an em­
ployee of the agency involved in the care of the student nor has any 
other conflict of interest, conducts the hearing.110 Any party to a 
hearing has the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel.111 
The party may also present evidence, and confront, cross-examine, 
and compel attendance of witnesses.112 During the pendency of an 
administrative or judicial proceeding, the child generally stays in 
the current educational placement, although there is an exception 
for students who are subject to disciplinary action.113 In addition, 
the requirement that schools provide FAPE to all eligible children 
extends to children whom the school has suspended or expelled, 
although, there are also exceptions to this requirement.114 Finally, 
there is a requirement of parents; they must provide prior notifica­
tion to the school if they unilaterally seek to place their child in a 
private school at public expense. l15 
IDEA further provides for judicial remedies to protect dis­
abled children's educational rights. Ifa local educational agency 
("LEA") conducts the initial hearing, the parents may appeal to the 
state educational agency ("SEA").116 However, in addition, any 
party aggrieved by the findings or decision made in the initial ad­
ministrative hearing or appeal may bring a civil action.u7 With re­
spect to relief, the statute authorizes any state court of competent 
jurisdiction or any federal district court to grant such relief as it 
determines is appropriate.us In conjunction, if the parent is the 
prevailing party, they may be entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees. 119 While Congress clearly created a cause of action for par­
ents, it failed to elucidate the meaning of "appropriate relief."120 A 
large part of the controversy over whether compensatory damages 
are available results from this question of what constitutes appro­
priate relief. 
110. 34 C.F.R § 3OO.S08. 
111. 20 U.S.c. § 141S(h)(1). 
112. Id. § 141S(h)(2). 
113. Id. § 141S(j); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 30S (1988) (holding that special educa­
tion students could not be suspended for more than ten days without parental consent 
or a court order if their misbehavior related to their disability). Section 141S(j) is com­
monly referred to as the "stay-put" provision. 
114. 20 U.S.C. § 141S(k) (2000). 

I1S. Id. § 1412(a)(1O)(C). 

116. Id. § 141S(g). 
117. Id. § 141S(i)(2)(A). 
118. Id. § 141S(i)(2)(A) & (B). 
119. Id. § 141S(i)(3)(B). 
120. Id. § 141S(i)(2)(B)(iii). 
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3. Appropriate Relief 
Section 1415(i)(2)(B) specifically provides that the court "shall 
grant such relief" as it "determines is appropriate."121 Plaintiffs 
rely on this "appropriate relief" provision to seek a range of reme­
dies. Likewise, courts interpret the provision in several ways due to 
its broad language. Consequently, courts award the fol1owing types 
of relief: 
1) declaratory or injunctive relief, such as an order to keep a 
district from changing a student's placement or one requir­
ing an improved IEP;122 
2) tuition reimbursement for a private placement paid for by 
parents;123 
3) 	an extension of compensatory educational services past the 
child's twenty-first birthday or beyond the regular school 
year to offset the temporary denial of a FAPE;124 and 
4) 	an award of reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party.125 
While the most common remedy under IDEA is declaratory or 
injunctive relief,126 each of the above has become quite common 
today.127 However, it remains unclear whether 1415(i)(2)(B) allows 
121. Id. 
122. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176 (1982). 
123. Sch. Comrn. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (holding 
that parents can be reimbursed for the reasonable cost of unilateral placement when 
FAPE is not available in a public setting and parent's placement is proper); see also 
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12-15 (1993) (holding that FAPE 
requirements do not apply to private placement). Such reimbursement is not the same 
thing as monetary damages. Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (declaring that reimbursement claims should not be characterized as "dam­
ages"). IDEA '97 now authorizes such reimbursement. 20 U.S.c. § 1412(a)(1O)(C). 
124. E.g., M.C. ex reI. J.c. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395-97 (3d Cir. 
1996); Pihl v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1993). Compensatory education 
could also include extended school year (ESY) services or additional tutoring. 
125. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000). This provision was part of the Handi­
capped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796. One of 
Congress' chief aims in passing the amendment was to authorize the awarding of rea­
sonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
126. E.g., Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627,628 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that injunc­
tive relief such as ordering an appropriate placement for a child is the ordinary remedy 
under the IDEA). 
127. See generally Jean M. Bond, Casebrief, Making Up for Lost Time: The Third 
Circuit's Use of Remedies for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 46 VILL. L. REV. 777 (2001) (discussing available remedies in the Third Circuit); 
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Remedies for a School District's Failure to Provide Services 
Under IDEA, 112 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996) (outlining available remedies). 
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for an award of compensatory damages. Historically, courts have 
held that damages are not available under IDEA unless a school 
district's failure to comply with IDEA is flagrant.128 More recently, 
some courts have determined that compensatory damages are ap­
propriate relief even for non-flagrant violations of IDEA.129 The 
majority of courts, however, have decided that § 1415(i)'s appropri­
ate relief language does not authorize an award of compensatory 
damages.13o Consequently, parents have used a later provision of 
§ 1415 as the basis for compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983. 
II. SECTION 1415(L): THE HEART OF THE CONTROVERSY 

SURROUNDING WHETHER COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE AN 

AVAILABLE REMEDY UNDER SECTION 1983 

In response to the seeming unavailability of compensatory 
damages under IDEA's §1415(i)'s "appropriate relief" language, 
parents have pursued compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983. 
These suits rely on § 1415(1)-originally codified as § 1415(f)-a 
provision that Congress added to § 1415 in 1986.131 Because 
128. E.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
damages are not appropriate relief absent exceptional circumstances because IDEA's 
purpose to educate is not furthered by such an award, and awarding damages has a 
potentially chilling effect on the development of innovative educational approaches). 
See generally Allen G. Osbourne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Are Damages an Available 
Remedy When a School District Fails to Provide an Appropriate Education under 
IDEA?, 152 EDuc. L. REP. 1, 2 (20Gl) (discussing the development of this area of law). 
129. E.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1995); see also sources 
cited infra note 163 and accompanying text. See generally David Stewart, Expanding 
Remedies for IDEA Violations, 31 J.L. & EDuc. 373 (2002) (arguing that monetary 
damages are available and appropriate); Kara W. Edmunds, Note, Implying Damages 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools Adds New Fuel to the Argument, 27 GA. L. REv. 789 (1993) (arguing in 
favor of compensatory damages); Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals With Dis­
abilities Education Act: Determining "Appropriate Relief' In A Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 
VA. L. REV. 853 (1999) (arguing in favor of compensation for prevailing parents in an 
IDEA action for the time and effort spent litigating on behalf of their child). But see 
Seligmann, supra note 8 (arguing that monetary damages are neither available nor 
appropriate). 
130. E.g., Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) (holding that "IDEA does not provide for compensatory money damages"), 
affd, 181 F.3d 84 (1999), affd, 208 F.3d 204 (2000); see also infra note 165. For a 
discussion on the availability of punitive damages, see Stephanie L. Gill, Comment, 
Punitive Damages: Flying in the Face of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?, 
100 DICK. L. REV. 383 (1996). 
131. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 
Stat. 796. Section 1415(1) was originally § 1415(f); it was renumbered as part of IDEA 
Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37. This Note will refer to this 
proviSion as § 1415(1) for the sake of consistency. 
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§ 1415(1) allows parents to seek remedies under other statutes, this 
provision most influences the interaction of § 1983 and IDEA. 
A. The Origins of Section 1415(1) 
Congress added § 1415(1) through an amendment to IDEA 
called the Handicapped Children's Protection Act (HCPA).132 
Congress enacted the HCPA largely in response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson,133 which primarily addressed 
the awarding of attorney's fees and determining whether IDEA was 
the exclusive mechanism for vindicating a disabled child's educa­
tional rights.134 In Smith, the school committee placed eight-year­
old Tommy Smith, who suffered from multiple handicaps including 
cerebral palsy, into a hospital's day program. The school commit­
tee then refused to pay for his continued education.135 The lower 
court found that the school committee denied Tommy Smith a 
FAPE by failing to provide a full hearing before terminating fund­
ing for his special education program. The court ordered the school 
committee to pay the full cost of his attendance.136 As part of the 
suit, Tommy's parents asserted claims for constitutional violations 
under § 1983 for what were basically statutory violations of IDEA. 
They also sought an award of attorney's fees, relying on 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1988(b),137 which the lower court granted.138 On appeal, the First 
Circuit reversed the district court's decision concerning attorney's 
fees and the Smiths appealed to the Supreme Court.139 
The Smiths argued that as the prevailing party asserting sub­
stantial but unaddressed constitutional claims cognizable under 
§ 1983, they were entitled to attorney's fees. 140 School and state 
officials argued that the Smiths were attempting to "circumvent the 
lack of ... [an] attorney's fees" provision in IDEA by "adding sur­
plus constitutional claims."141 The Court concluded that for claims 
132. Id. 
133. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
134. Id. at 994. 
135. !d. at 995. 
136. /d. at 1000. 
137. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-31 (1980). The Smith Court cited 
Maher in acknowledging the general rule that plaintiffs who prevail in § 1983 claims, or 
who assert a "substantial but unaddressed" § 1983 claim and prevail on other grounds 
are entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). Smith, 468 U.S. at 1000. 
138. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1000. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1004. 
141. Id. at 1005. 
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based on either IDEA, § 504, or the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause, IDEA was "the exclusive avenue through 
which the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their 
claim."142 Consequently, because there was no provision for attor­
ney's fees, a suit for violation of IDEA did not allow attorney's fees 
under other federal statutes.143 The Court also noted that IDEA 
"is a comprehensive scheme ... to aid the States in complying with 
their constitutional obligations" to educate disabled children. l44 
"Allowing a plaintiff to circumvent [IDEA's] available remedies" 
by relying on § 1983 "would be inconsistent with that . . . 
scheme."145 
The dissent in Smith concluded that § 1983 must be read to­
gether with IDEA to determine whether a § 1983 claim is availa­
ble.146 Arguing that the aspects of § 1983 that do not conflict with 
IDEA should be preserved, the dissent characterized the majority's 
decision as a repeal of § 1983 to the extent that it covered the 
Smiths' claims.147 The dissent concluded by inviting Congress to 
act.148 
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, Con­
gress introduced the Handicapped Children's Protection Act 
("HCPA") in February of 1985.149 Congress stated that the primary 
purposes of the Act were "to authorize the award of reasonable 
attorneys' fees to certain prevailing parties [and] to clarify 
[IDEA's] effect ... on rights, procedures and remedies under other 
laws relating to the prohibition of discrimination ...."150 The pro­
vision of attorney's fees created some controversy because of con­
cern that it would encourage litigation, thereby overburdening 
financially strapped school districts.1s1 In fact, IDEA does not au­
thorize a hearing officer to award attorney's fees, so the parent 
must generally go to court to collect them.ls2 Despite this concern, 
142. [d. at 1013. 
143. [d. at 1009-13. 
144. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009. 
145. [d. at 1012. 
146. [d. at 1023 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
147. [d. at 1025 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
148. [d. at 1031 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
149. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799 
(referring to the decision and quoting the dissent's challenge to act). 
150. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 
Stat. 796. 
151. 132 CONGo REC. H4841-0l (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statements of Rep. 
Bartlett). 
152. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B-F). 
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this is an important provision because it gives parents with limited 
financial resources access to court. 
Congress also addressed the clarification of IDEA's relation­
ship to other laws. "Nothing in this title shall be construed to re­
strict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under 
the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other 
Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children and 
youth ...."153 When Congress later reauthorized IDEA in 1997, it 
added specific reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA").154 
Section 1415(1) also includes an exhaustion requirement.155 
Before seeking relief under another law that is also available under 
IDEA, the plaintiff must generally exhaust all available IDEA 
hearing and appeals procedures.156 In essence, Congress does not 
want parents to circumvent the extensive procedural protections of 
IDEA.157 However, courts have ruled that plaintiffs need not ex­
haust administrative remedies when not required by IDEA, such as 
when seeking those proceedings would be futile. 158 
It is important to note that nothing in § 1415(1) currently states 
that it restricts the ability of parents to seek remedies pursuant to 
the ADA, § 504, or the Constitution. This indicates that IDEA is 
not the exclusive remedy available to disabled children and over­
turns Smith's broad ruling that IDEA precludes independent but 
overlapping statutory or constitutional claims. In addition, dam­
ages remedies for violations of statutory or constitutional rights 
153. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 
Stat. 796. 
154. Id. The addition of the ADA was made as part of IDEA Amendments of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, 98. 
155. This "exhaustion requirement" is becoming a more frequent subject of litiga­
tion. For an up-to-date discussion of IDEA's exhaustion requirement see Susan G. 
Clark, Administrative Remedy Under IDEA: Must It Be Exhausting?, 163 EDue. L. 
REP. 1 (2002), and Mary C. Stablein, Note, An ID EA Gone Out of Control: Covington 
v. Knox County School Board, 45 How. L.J. 643 (2002). 
156. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(1) (2000). These procedures typically include a hearing 
before an impartial hearing officer and may require an appeal to the state review board 
before filing a claim in court. 
157. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799. 
158. Id. The Ninth Circuit has established a test for application of the futility 
exception. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999) (hold­
ing that exhaustion was excused where parent sought direct judicial relief under § 504 
and the ADA pursuant to § 1983 because IDEA's available remedies were not suffi­
cient to address past physical injuries), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. 
Dec. 10,2002) (No. 02-890). 
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may be available pursuant to § 1983.159 As a result, if a school dis­
trict violated IDEA and the Constitution, for example, § 1415(1) 
would not limit the ability of the parents to seek compensatory 
damages for the constitutional violation . 
Section § 1415(1) does not, however, mention § 1983. There­
fore, the question remains whether this provision overturns Smith's 
more narrow holding that IDEA provides a comprehensive reme­
dial scheme and forecloses recourse to § 1983 as a remedy for 
IDEA violations. In the years since the passage of this amendment, 
"this silence has perplexed the courts and generated, to some de­
gree, a split of opinion among the Courts of Appeals regarding the 
relationship between § 1983 and IDEA."160 Although Congress in­
tended the HCPA to clarify its position concerning the relationship 
between IDEA and other laws and remedies,161 it failed with re­
spect to § 1983. 
B. The State of the Law Today 
An examination of decisions by the United States Courts of 
Appeals in this area of law is bewildering. The Third Circuit issued 
the leading opinion holding that a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 com­
pensatory damages claim for violation of rights guaranteed by 
IDEA.162 Other circuits have not directly addressed the issue, but 
their opinions are often interpreted as supporting a § 1983 compen­
satory damages award.163 The Seventh Circuit has issued inconsis­
159. For example, although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether § 504 
provides a monetary damages remedy against recipients of federal aid, most lower 
courts have held that damages would be available if the violation resulted from bad 
faith or gross misjudgment. See, e.g., Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas., 141 F.3d 524 (4th 
Cir. 1998); Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982); Wenger v. Canas­
tota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 181 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 
1999); see also HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 112 (discussing remedies under § 504); 
Zirkel, supra note 13 (discussing § 504 and the ADA). With respect to constitutional 
claims, the Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 claimant may recover compensatory 
damages as long as the claimant proves actual injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 
(1978). 
160. Andrew S.v. Sch. Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
161. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
162. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d .484,494 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing plaintiff to pursue 
§ 1983 compensatory damages claims for IDEA violations). 
163. Technically, the Second Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, but recent 
decisions within the Circuit have allowed claims. M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 21, 28-29 (D. Conn. 2001) (allowing plaintiff to bring a § 1983 compensatory 
damages claim and listing other cases). Furthermore, a previous Second Circuit opinion 
has been widely read to indicate support for claims. Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 
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tent opinions, apparently still forming its position.164 Still other 
circuits have held that plaintiffs may bring § 1983 claims based on 
violation of IDEA, but compensatory damages are altogether un­
available or available only in exceptional situations.165 In contrast, 
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held that plaintiffs cannot bring 
§ 1983 actions for compensatory damages resulting from violations 
of IDEA.166 Due to the unsettled nature of case law, frequent ar­
guments have surfaced in support of both sides. 
1. In Favor of Awarding § 1983 Compensatory Damages 
In W.B. v. Matula, the plaintiff sought damages for a persistent 
refusal on the part of school officials to evaluate, classify, and pro­
vide her child with the necessary educational services.167 The stu­
dent suffered from Tourette's Syndrome, an obsessive-compulsive 
759 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding § 1983 claims are allowed under EHA, the predecessor to 
IDEA). The Fifth Circuit also appears to support § 1983 claims. Angela L. v. Pasadena 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1193 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (clarifying its position in the 
footnote). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, but recent decisions 
within the circuit favor claims. E.g., Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 
166 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (allowing claim and indicating other cases). 
Similarly, there are no cases on point from the D.C. Circuit, but a lower court decision 
appears to allow § 1983 claims. Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 
(D.D.C. 2001) (stating that compensatory damages are an extraordinary remedy and 
suggesting a four part test for plaintiffs to prove that they are warranted). The language 
of an Eleventh Circuit case could also be read to allow § 1983 claims where exhaustion 
could be excused. N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(dismissing the § 1983 damages claim for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative 
remedies). 
164. In Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District, 98 F.3d 989, 
991 (7th Cir. 1996), the court stated that plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA's administrative 
remedies even if they wanted a form of relief (compensatory damages) that IDEA did 
not supply. This has been interpreted as disallowing § 1983 compensatory damages 
claims. But cf Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Con­
gress did not intend to foreclose resort to § 1983 but actually provided for its availabil­
ity to enforce IDEA). 
165. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits seem to allow § 1983 claims for violations of 
IDEA, but the circuits disallow damages and are, therefore, often cited as disallowing 
claims. Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 301 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002); Heidemann v. 
Rother, 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 
980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1992); Wayne County Reg'l Educ. Servo Agency V. Pappas, 56 F. 
Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
166. Padilla V. Sch. Dist. No.1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding 
§ 1983 unavailable); Sellers V. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(same). The First Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, however, two district court 
decisions fall within the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. ); Smith V. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. 
No. 6,2001 WL 420361 (D. Me. 2001) (Recommended Decision on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment); Andrew S. V. Sch. Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 
241 (D. Mass. 1999). 
167. W.B. V. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), 
and he experienced great difficulty in first and second grade with­
out services.168 Despite resistance by school officials, the mother 
eventually succeeded in having her son evaluated and provided 
with special education services.169 The plaintiff mother sought 
money damages for the period preceding the school district's com­
pliance with IDEA's requirementsyo The Third Circuit, relying on 
an examination of legislative history and the absence of limiting 
language in IDEA, held that "[i]n enacting § 1415([1]), Congress 
specifically intended that IDEA violations could be redressed by 
§ 504 and § 1983 actions."171 Moreover, the court held that the 
traditional presumption in favor of a federal court's power to order 
all appropriate relief applies; therefore, a § 1983 damages action is 
allowed for violations of IDEA.172 
This court, along with others on this side of the controversy,173 
essentially assert that nothing in the text or history of the relevant 
statutes expresses a congressional intent to limit relief in any 
way.174 In addition, there is a presumption in favor of the power of 
federal courts to award any appropriate reliefYs Despite this 
stance, these courts have been reluctant to grant money damages.176 
This reluctance is reflected by a warning issued in Matula, "We cau­
tion that in fashioning a remedy ... a district court may wish to 
order educational services . . . or reimbursement . . . rather than 
compensatory damages for generalized pain and suffering."177 This 
recognition of a right to compensatory damages, yet hesitation to 
award them, stands in contrast to the clear refusal asserted by the 
Fourth and Tenth Circuits. 
168. Id. at 489-90. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 490. 

17l. Id. at 494. 

172. Id. at 495 (referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (stating that "absent clear direction to the 
contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate re­
lief" for a cognizable statutory violation)). See discussion infra Part 1II.B.2. 
173. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
174. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). 
175. Id. 
176. E.g., Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(stating that compensatory damages are an extraordinary remedy and suggesting a four 
part test for plaintiffs to prove that they are warranted); see infra note 269. 
177. Matula, 67 F.3d at 495. 
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2. Against Awarding Section 1983 Compensatory Damages 
In Sellers v. School Board of Manassas,178 the Fourth Circuit 
held that a plaintiff could not bring a compensatory damages claim 
pursuant to § 1983 for an alleged violation of IDEA. In Sellers, the 
plaintiff was an eighteen year-old boy who had recently been diag­
nosed as learning disabled and emotionally disturbed.179 He and 
his parents sought compensatory damages under IDEA, arguing 
that the school should have known that he required special educa­
tion services in grade school.180 In denying their damages claim, 
the court conceded that although HCPA, which created § 1415(1), 
did effect a legislative reversal of much of the Smith holding, it did 
not afford the plaintiff a right to demand compensatory damages.181 
Since IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for viola­
tions of its requirements, students and parents may not rely on 
§ 1983 to sue for violations of IDEA.182 Permitting recovery of 
general damages through § 1983 would subject school boards to po­
tentialliability "exponentially greater" than any liability for tuition 
reimbursement that they currently face.183 The vague language of 
§ 1415(1) does not place them on notice of such open-ended 
liability.184 
. In Padilla v. School District No.1 ,185 the Tenth Circuit joined 
the Sellers court in holding that § 1415(1) left intact Smith's implica­
tion that IDEA may not provide the basis for § 1983 claims based 
on violation of IDEA. It also noted that since Congress passed 
HCPA, the Supreme Court has cited Smith and the IDEA as exam­
ples of an exhaustive legislative enforcement scheme that precludes 
§ 1983 causes of action.186 These courts, along with the other courts 
on this side of the controversy,187 essentially assert that § 1415(1) 
overrules much, but not all, of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith. Claims under § 1983 for ADA, § 504, or constitutional vio­
lations may be permissible, but § 1983 claims based on violations of 
178. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998). 
179. Id. at 525. 
180. Id. at 525-26. 
181. Id. at 530. 
182. !d. at 529. 
183. Seliers, 141 F.3d at 532. 
184. Id. 
185. 223 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). 
186. Id. at 1273 (referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Blessing v. Free­
stone, 520 U.S. 329, 347-48 (1997), and Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & 
Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987». 
187. See supra note 165-66. 
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IDEA are not. Neither the text nor the legislative history clearly 
authorizes such claims, and there are strong policy reasons against 
doing so. 
3. Avoiding the Issue 
IDEA's exhaustion requirement has enabled some courts to 
avoid addressing whether a § 1983 damages claim is permissible for 
a violation of IDEA.188 As mentioned, parents often bring multiple 
claims in special education cases.189 When parents sue under other 
statutes, such as the ADA or § 504, for alleged violations that could 
have been brought under IDEA, courts have held that the parents 
must first exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies.19o In so hold­
ing, many of these courts never reach the issue of the relationship 
between IDEA and § 1983 compensatory damages claims, only ad­
ding to the perplexity surrounding the question.. The Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to hear this issue in the Sellers case in 
October 1998, but it denied certiorari.191 
III. 	 ARE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 1983 FOR 
VIOLATION OF IDEA AVAILABLE AND ApPROPRIATE? 
A close examination of the language of § 1415(1), along with an 
exploration of its legislative history and other means of statutory 
interpretation, fails to provide clear guidance as to whether courts 
should recognize § 1983 compensatory damages claims for violation 
of IDEA. Consequently, it is necessary to examine additional argu­
ments to reach a conclusion. 
A. 	 Section 1415(1)'s Language, Legislative History, and Structure: 
A Lack of Clarity 
In any circumstance requiring statutory interpretation, an ex­
amination of the text is the first step.192 If the plain meaning of the 
188. See supra notes 155-58. E.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 
56 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a student may not bring suit for money damages under 
§ 1983 without exhausting IDEA's administrative remedies, thereby not reaching the 
issue of whether a § 1983 damages claim is permissible). 
189. 	 See supra notes 11-12. 
190. E.g., N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(dismissing the § 1983 damages claim for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative 
remedies). 
191. 	 Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998). 
192. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (asserting that 
the Court's "first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at 
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text is clear, the inquiry stops there.193 If the statute is ambiguous, 
courts frequently turn to legislative history and other canons of stat­
utory construction to discern legislative intent.194 
1. The Text of the Statute 
Section 1415(1) states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be con­
strued to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies avail­
able under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal 
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities ...."195 Cer­
tainly, the language of the statute indicates that IDEA provisions 
are not the exclusive avenue through which remedies are available 
to students with disabilities. In addition, the text of the statute indi­
cates no limit on the applicability of "other Federal laws" that may 
be used to protect handicapped children, and § 1983 certainly falls 
within the "other Federal laws" category. Therefore, courts and 
commentators alike argue that the plain language of the statute 
must be read to permit § 1983 actions for violation of IDEA.196 
Yet, the language of the statute lacks any specific reference to 
§ 1983.197 This is arguably significant because Congress amended 
the IDEA in 1997 to add a specific reference to another federal 
statute, the ADA.198 Furthermore, as a statute of general applica­
tion, § 1983 mentions neither disability nor children. Therefore, 
other courts and commentators argue199 that it should not be con-
issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the 
case"). 
193. Id. (stating that "the inquiry must cease" if the meaning is clear). 
194. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (stating that the 
search for Congress's intent could begin and end with the text and structure of the 
statute). 
195. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(1) (2000). 
196. E.g., Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 621 (7th Cir. 1997) (asserting that 
Congress responded to Smith by enacting this amendment allowing § 1983 claims); 
Stewart, supra, note 129. 
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). 
198. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, 
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or 
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except 
that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also 
available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) 
of this section shall be exhausted to the same extend as would be required had 
the action been brought under this subchapter. 
20 U.S.c. § 1415(1). See supra note 153-54 and accompanying text. 
199. E.g., Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1998) (not­
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sidered a "[f]ederal law [ ] protecting the rights of children with 
disabilities."20o As such, the meaning of the text of the statute is, at 
best, ambiguous. Consequently, other methods of inquiry are re­
quired to settle this debate. 
2. The Legislative History 
Legislative history is another common method courts use in 
determining legislative intent and, thereby, the meaning of a stat­
ute.201 While considering HCPA, the amendment that created 
§ 1415(1), both branches of Congress202 discussed the purpose of the 
proposed amendment and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith.203 The House Report included mention of § 1983, while the 
Senate's comments focused on § 504 and the recovery of attorney's 
fees. The House Report stated that "since 1978, it has been Con­
gress' intent to permit parents to pursue the rights of handicapped 
children through IDEA, § 504 and § 1983 .... Congressional in­
tent was ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court when ... it handed 
down its decision in Smith v. Robinson."204 The Senate Report 
stated, "[T]he Supreme Court, in Smith . .. determined that Con­
gress intended that the [IDEA] provide the exclusive ... remedies 
in special education cases covered by that act. The effect ... was to 
preclude parents from bringing special education cases under sec­
tion 504 ... and recovering attorney's fees available under section 
505 of that act . . . . "205 In its introductory stages, then, general 
congressional intent seemed to favor overruling both the broad and 
specific holdings of Smith. 
After debate in both the House and the Senate, the joint Con­
ference Committee adopted the language of the Senate bill.206 The 
Conference Report stated that "[w]ith slightly different wording, 
both the Senate bill and the House amendment authorize the filing 
ing the lack of specific reference to § 1983 and pointing out the lack of specific refer­
ence to § 1983). 
200. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(1) (2000). 
201. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,575 (1995) (using legislative 
history to examine a statute). But see Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982) (rejecting an argument based on legislative history be­
cause it was "too thin a reed on which to base an interpretation"). 
202. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 1 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985). 
203. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); see discussion supra Part ILA. 
204. H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985). 
205. S. REP. NO. 99-112, at 1 (1985). 
206. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-687, at 7 (1985). 
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of civil actions under legal authorities other than" IDEA.207 This 
language serves to clarify both branches' intent to overturn Smith's 
broad ruling that IDEA precludes overlapping, but independent, 
statutory or constitutional claims. The report continued, "The 
House recedes,"208 meaning that the committee adopted the lan­
guage of the Senate bill, which included no specific textual refer­
ence to § 1983. However, the report went on to state, "It is the 
conferees' intent that actions brought under 42 U.S.c. 1983 are gov­
erned by this provision." 209 
This is significant for a number of reasons. First, the Confer­
ence Committee adopted the wording of the Senate bill, which did 
not include any specific reference to § 1983. This indicates that per­
haps the Senate never intended to include § 1983 in the text of the 
statute. If true, this omission seems to indicate a lack of intent on 
the part of at least one branch of Congress. Second, this "oblique 
reference"210 indicates that Congress was disinclined to entitle 
plaintiffs to the full remedies available under § 1983 for every viola­
tion of IDEA. If Congress intended to include § 1983 claims for 
IDEA violations, it could have made the point clear by simply in­
cluding § 1983 in the text of the statute when it was finalizing the 
wording of the amendment in conference. Instead, through an 
omission seemingly devoid of explanation, it chose not to. Finally, 
at least one commentator has suggested that the absence in the leg­
islative history of any debate concerning the ramifications of creat­
ing a damages claim under § 1983 for violation of IDEA is perhaps 
most significant.211 If Congress intended to "create a new and pow­
erful damage remedy for IDEA claims" there should have been as 
much debate over it as there was concerning the attorney's fees 
provision that was the main thrust of the amendment.212 
Despite these seemingly inconclusive arguments, some courts 
have relied on these statements as an explicit indication of congres­
sional intent in § 1415(1): "Far from inferring a congressional intent 
to prevent § 1983 actions predicated on IDEA then, we conclude 
that Congress explicitly approved such actions. "213 Other courts 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Andrew S. v. Sch. Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
211. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 506. 
212. Id. 
213. E.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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have held that the legislative history supports a narrower interpre­
tation: "When construed in their most natural form, the excerpts 
demonstrate the unremarkable proposition that Congress intended 
section 1415([1]) to restore the ability of disabled children and their 
parents to utilize section 1983 to protect constitutional rights."214 
However, at least one court criticized this narrow interpretation 
and pointed out that nothing in the legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended for § 1983 to apply only to "constitutional viola­
tions."215 In addition, a narrow interpretation would mean that 
Congress amended IDEA to give plaintiffs the right to bring consti­
tutional claims under §1983; a right they already possessed.216 In 
conclusion, an exploration of legislative history fails to provide 
clear congressional intent to authorize § 1983 compensatory dam­
age claims for violations of IDEA. 
3. The Purpose and Structure of the Statute 
Courts also consider a statute's purpose and structure in at­
tempting to construe its language.217 In so doing, courts attempt to 
interpret the meaning of the statute so as not to conflict with its 
purpose and structure.218 Congress enacted IDEA to provide ac­
cess to a FAPE for children with disabilities. Thus, its purpose is to 
meet students' educational needs. In order to ensure this purpose, 
Congress developed elaborate procedural mechanisms and compre­
hensive remedies. Accordingly, courts have stated that the law was 
designed to preserve the right to a F APE, not provide a forum for 
tort-like claims; furthermore, § 1983 damages are inconsistent with 
IDEA's elaborate statutory scheme.219 One court has pointed out 
that the Supreme Court has made references to IDEA in this vein: 
"In Wright, the Court noted that EHA [IDEA's predecessor] itself 
'provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congres­
214. E.g., Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 1998) (dis­
cussing § 1415(f), though the language to which the Court refers is currently enacted at 
§ 1415(1». 
215. Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
216. Id. at 1295. 
217. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (stating that in determin­
ing the meaning of a statute, the Court "look[s] not only to the particular statutory 
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy"). 
218. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,284 (1998) (stating that 
in the absence of clear congressional intent, the Court should not develop a remedial 
scheme "at odds with the statutory structure and purpose"). 
219. E.g., Sellers, 141 F.3d at 531. 
331 2003) INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
sional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy.' "220 On the other 
hand, because IDEA is a statute designed to provide increased pro­
tection to children with disabilities, it seems inconsistent with the 
statute's purpose to deny those children the protection of § 1983.221 
In sum, neither the text nor the legislative history of § 1415(1) 
clearly authorizes an award of compensatory damages under 
§ 1983.. Other canons of statutory construction also fail to resolve 
the question. In view of the lack of clear evidence to support either 
side in this debate over the proper interpretation of § 1415, it is 
necessary to consider alternative arguments. 
B. 	 Alternative Arguments Concerning the Availability of Section 
1983 Damages Claims for Violation of IDEA 
Not surprisingly, there are many arguments on both sides of 
the issue.222 Three arguments in particular seem to be most com­
pelling. The first concerns whether or not IDEA's comprehensive 
remedial scheme precludes resort to § 1983. The second addresses 
the application of the Franklin presumption to the question of 
whether compensatory damages are appropriate pursuant to 
§ 1983. The third argument deals with the potential financial impli­
cations for school districts of allowing compensatory damages 
claims. 
1. 	 IDEA's Comprehensive Remedial Scheme and 

Preclusion of Enforcement Under Section 1983 

As discussed, combining § 1983 with a federal statute in order 
to sue a school district or its personnel is not a simple task.223 
Courts must begin. by determining whether Congress intended a 
statute to provide a private right of action.224 This question is not at 
issue in IDEA cases because the statute confers an express right.225 
However, this right alone does not guarantee a plaintiff the avail a­
220. 	 Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Wright 
v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987». 
221. See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Special Education 
Students' Records: Do the 1999 IDEA Regulations Mandate That Schools Comply with 
FERPA?, 8 J.L. & POL'y 455, 475 (2000) (arguing that IDEA's overarching structure 
undercuts the argument in support of an IDEA exception to FERPA). 
222. For a cataloguing of the traditional arguments concerning the award of com­
pensatory damages in this context, see Edmunds, supra, note 129, at 802-16. 
223. 	 See supra Part LA. 
224. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002) (holding that FERPA's confi­
dentiality provisions do not create a private right of action enforceable under § 1983). 
225. 	 20 U.S.c. § 1415(1) (2000). 
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bility of compensatory damages claims pursuant to § 1983. The Su­
preme Court has stated that determining whether a statutory 
violation may be enforced through § 1983 requires a "different in­
quiry" than determining whether a private right of action exists.226 
Aiding potential plaintiffs is the "general rule" that once a 
plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right of 
action, it is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.227 However, the 
Supreme Court has held that a state may rebut this presumption by 
showing that Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy under 
§ 1983,"228 either expressly229 or "impliedly, by creating a compre­
hensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 
enforcement under § 1983."230 Given no express congressional 
mandate, the issue is whether IDEA's enforcement mechanisms are 
so comprehensive as to be considered incompatible with an action 
under § 1983. 
Some courts and commentators have argued that IDEA is just 
such a scheme.231 This argument is premised on the fact that IDEA 
establishes extensive rights and remedies for students with disabili­
ties. These rights include the right to: (1) receive written prior no­
tice; (2) give or withhold consent at specific times; (3) access their 
child's educational records; (4) obtain an independent educational 
evaluation; (5) present a complaint to initiate a due process hearing; 
(6) mediate their complaint; (7) file a complaint with the SEA; (8) 
have a due process hearing; (9) have the results of that hearing re­
viewed; (10) appeal the final decision to court;. (11) have their child 
"stay put" while proceedings are pending; and (12) receive attor­
ney's fees.232 Despite the fact that IDEA does not specify the rem­
edies available for violation of these rights, courts233 have 
developed a battery of remedies. These include declaratory and in­
junctive relief, reimbursement for tuition and related services, com­
226. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990). 
227. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (holding 
that "absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the 
power to award any appropriate relieP' for violation of a federal right). 
228. Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2276 n.4 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 
n.9 (1984)). 
229. Id. (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 
423 (1987)). 
230. Id. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)). 
231. E.g., Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (argu­
ing that because of IDEA's comprehensive provisions, Congress would have specifically 
mentioned § 1983 if it had intended to allow monetary damages through § 1983). 
232. HUEFNER, supra note 12, at 172-85. 
233. See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing the availability of judicial review). 
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pensatory education, and reasonable attorney's fees. 234 Arguably, 
these rights and remedies taken together adequately protect the ed­
ucational needs of students with disabilities, and render compensa­
tory damages pursuant to § 1983 unnecessary. 
Courts and commentators espousing this view also point out 
that the Supreme Court appears to agree. In Smith, the Court char­
acterized IDEA as having a remedial scheme comprehensive 
enough to supercede § 1983.235 Courts and commentators on the 
other side argue that it was precisely that ruling which compelled 
Congress to amend IDEA.236 They argue that § 1415(1) specifically 
overruled Smith, making all federal statutes available, including 
§ 1983.237 "The ultimate question, in respect to whether private in­
dividuals may bring a lawsuit to enforce a federal statute, through 
42 U.S.c. § 1983 or otherwise, is a question of congressional in­
tent."238 Accordingly, this leads back to the original question: 
When Congress created IDEA's elaborate enforcement scheme, 
did it intend to preclude resort to § 1983? This is necessarily fol­
lowed by a second question: When Congress amended IDEA, cre­
ating § 1415(1), did it intend to create new rights enforceable under 
§ 1983? The Supreme Court has recently stated that "if Congress 
wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so 
in clear and unambiguous terms. "239 If that was Congress' intent, it 
could certainly have been more clear about it. 
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has only found a 
comprehensive administrative scheme precluding enforceability 
under § 1983 in two cases.240 This would seem to indicate that the 
Supreme Court is hesitant to preclude resort to all available reme­
dies. This is the premise of the next argument. 
234. See supra Part I.B.3. (discussing these remedies). 
235. E.g., Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (arguing 
that Smith's narrow implication that IDEA's comprehensive remedial framework fore­
closes a § 1983 remedy is still viable); accord Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie, 98 
F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996). 
236. Stewart, supra note 123, at 378 (arguing that preclusion is an incorrect inter­
pretation of congressional intent, especially in light of the amendment of § 1415(1»; see 
supra Part I.B. 
237. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). 
238. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2279 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
239. Id. at 2279 (majority opinion). 
240. See sources cited supra note 31. 
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2. 	 Presumption in Favor of All Appropriate Relief: What is 
Appropriate? 
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Public Schools241 provides another important argument in 
this debate. Franklin involved a female high school student's alle­
gations of sexual harassment by a male teacher.242 After finding an 
implied right of action under Title IX,243 the Court appli~d a con­
tract-law analogy to find a damages remedy available.244 This con­
tract-law analogy contends that Congress' power to legislate under 
the spending power requires that the funding recipient know and 
accept the conditions of the "contract. "245 In a later case, the Court 
also used this contract-law analogy to define the scope of conduct 
for which a recipient may be held liable to a third-party 
beneficiary.246 
In addition to the availability of a damages remedy, the Court 
established what is commonly considered the Franklin presump­
tion. In light of congressional silence concerning damage remedies, 
the Court laid down the general rule that "absent clear direction to 
the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to 
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought 
pursuant to a federal statute."247 Courts holding tliat compensatory 
damages can be awarded under § 1983 for violation of IDEA rely in 
large part on this general rule.248 These courts reason that all reme­
241. 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (holding that "absent clear direction to the con­
trary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in 
a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute"). 
242. A male teacher-coach sexually abused the young woman. The Court ac­
cepted the coercive sexual activity as "sexual harassment," a form of sexual discrimina­
tion prohibited by Title IX. Id. at 62-63. 
243. Because Title IX provides no explicit provision, the court implied a right of 
action for money damages. Id. at 65. See Cannon v. Univ.of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
709 (1979) (finding an implied right of action in Title IX for private parties). 
244. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-76. 
245. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (charac­
terizing spending clause legislation as "much in the nature of a contract: in return for 
federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions"). 
246. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (finding 
liability for intentional conduct which violated the clear terms of Title IX). But see 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (finding no liability for 
conduct unknown to any official where statute implies that only violation brought to 
attention are actionable); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25 (1981) (finding no liability for 
failure to comply with the unclear language describing a statute's purpose). 
247. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71. 
248. E.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Cappillino v. Hyde Park 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d 513, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. 
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dies, including compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983, are avail­
able absent direction to the contrary by Congress. Again, this leads 
back to an examination of the text and legislative history of the 
IDEA to determine whether there was congressional intent to dis­
allow these monetary damages. These courts find no such congres­
sional intent.249 
One commentator has suggested that the most compelling ar­
gument against the Franklin presumption is the Spending Clause 
Conditions Doctrine.25o That is, the IDEA established conditions 
for receipt of federal funds; these conditions should be clearly 
stated if the recipients are going to be held to them.251 Courts and 
commentators arguing that compensatory damages are not availa­
ble under § 1983 for violation of IDEA rely on this reasoning. If 
§ 1415(1) is going to be interpreted to mean that compensatory 
damages claims under § 1983 are allowed, this would significantly 
increase the potential liability facing school districts. One court 
stated that "without a much clearer mandate from Congress, no 
such profound alteration in the relationship between school officials 
and disabled students and their families can be inferred in a statute 
enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power."252 
A recent Supreme Court decision may change the debate over 
if and how Franklin applies to the issue of whether compensatory 
damages under § 1983 are available for violation of IDEA. The Su­
preme Court recently appraised its Franklin decision in Barnes v. 
Gorman.253 In Barnes, the plaintiff was a paraplegic who suffered 
serious injuries while being transported in a police van that was not 
equipped to accommodate him. He was awarded compensatory 
and punitive damages under the ADA and § 504.254 Applying the 
general rule of Franklin, the Eighth Circuit held that punitive dam­
ages were available.255 The Supreme Court reversed. It noted that 
Supp. 940 (N.D. Ca. 1997); see Shannon, supra note 129, at 866·70 (discussing Matula's 
reliance on Franklin). 
249. Matula, 67 F.3d at 494-95; Capillino, 40 F. Supp. 2d. at 514-15; Eastin, 985 F. 
Supp. at 943-45. 
250. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 512. 
251. Id.; Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 531-32 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 1). 
252. Andrew S. v. Sch. Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237, 245 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
253. 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 and Franklin, 503 U.S. at 
74-74). 
254. The jury awarded him over $1 million in compensatory damages and $1.2 
million in punitive damages. Id. at 2100. 
255. Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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although Franklin did recognize a presumption in favor of any ap­
propriate relief, it did not describe the scope of "appropriate 
relief. "256 
The Court applied the same contract-law analogy to determine 
the scope of available remedies under Spending Clause statutes. 
The Court stated that a remedy is only appropriate relief if the re­
cipient is on notice that by accepting the funds, it is subjecting itself 
to liability.257 "A funding recipient is generally on notice that it is 
subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the rele­
vant legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in 
suits for breach of contract."258 Because punitive damages are gen­
erally not available for breach of contract, the Court ruled that they 
were not available in this case.259 The Court's finding also rested 
on its characterization of a punitive damages remedy as one of "in­
determinate magnitude" which could produce liability exceeding 
the level of federal funding. 260 This reasoning could be used to 
support the claim that compensatory damages should not be availa­
ble: If compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983 were available for 
violations of IDEA, claims could easily exceed school district's 
levels of federal funding.261 
On the other hand, the Court went on to state, "When a fed­
eral-funds recipient violates conditions of Spending Clause legisla­
tion, the wrong done is the failure to provide what the contractual 
obligation requires; and that wrong is 'made good' when the recipi­
ent compensates ... a third-party beneficiary ... for the loss caused 
by that failure." 262 This reasoning could be used to support the 
argument that compensatory damages should be awarded for viola­
tion of IDEA-especially when they are the only option for making 
the plaintiff whole. This may be especially true if, as stated by the 
Court in Barnes, a school district is considered to be on notice that 
256. Id. at 2097 ("We take up this question today."). 
257. Id. at 2101 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.) 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 2102. Drawing a final distinction between punitive and compensatory 
damages, the Court stated that punitive damages are not compensatory. Id. at 2103. 
This ruling would seem to indicate that punitive damages are not within the scope of the 
"appropriate relief" contemplated by Franklin's general rule and, therefore, that puni­
tive damages are not available for violation of IDEA. 
260. Barnes, 122 S.Ct. at 2102 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). 
261. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the financial ramifications of compensatory 
damages awards). 
262. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. at 2102. 
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traditional contract remedies, induding compensatory damages, are 
appropriate relief should it violate the conditions of the contract. 
3. The Primary Policy Argument: Financial Ramifications 
There are a number of policy arguments concerning whether 
§ 1983 compensatory damages awards are appropriate for violation 
of IDEA,263 but one of the more prominent arguments concerns 
the potential financial impact compensatory damage awards would 
have upon schools. Commentators have suggested that this cost is 
perhaps the main policy concern of courts that have refused to per­
mit § 1983 damages awards.264 In light of the costs associated not 
only with losing suits, but also defending them, this concern de­
serves serious consideration.265 
Those in favor of awarding damages argue that courts should 
not deny a remedy to students who have already been denied the 
protections promised by IDEA.266 They also assert that awarding 
damages will not create turmoil in our nation's educational sys­
tem.267 Instead, awarding damages will strengthen compliance with 
IDEA by "compel[ling] recalcitrant school systems to protect and 
implement the educational rights of children with disabilities."268 
263. For example, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have ruled that § 1983 claims 
may be based on violations of IDEA, but have disallowed damages. They reason that 
most courts have held that compensatory damages are not "appropriate relief" under 
IDEA's § 1415(i)(2). As such, granting compensatory damages for violation of IDEA 
pursuant to § 1983 is granting relief that is otherwise unavailable under IDEA. See, 
e.g., Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that because compen­
satory damages were not available under IDEA, they are not made available by 
§ 1983); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(same). 
264. See Shannon, supra note 129, at 865 (arguing in favor of compensation for 
prevailing parents in an IDEA action for the time and effort spent litigating on behalf 
of their child). 
265. Courts arguing against an award of compensatory damages make this argu­
ment. E.g., Kelly K. v. Framingham, 633 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) 
("Were courts to entertain claims ... the limited financial resources available to benefit 
children with special educational needs could be diverted from the programs the legisla­
tion was intended to protect."). 
266. Edmunds, supra, note 129, at 802-07 (identifying arguments in favor of com­
pensatory damages, such as the importance of remedies as an essential component of a 
private enforcement model; the creation of an attitude favoring compliance; the need to 
actively guarantees a free appropriate public education; and the existence of three doc­
trinal bases permitting such an award). 
267. Stewart, supra, note 129, at 379 (arguing that monetary damages are appro­
priate and should be available). 
268. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 512 (arguing against awarding compensatory 
damages) (citing Gary S. Gildin, Dis-qualified Immunity for Discrimination Against the 
Disabled, 1999 U. ILL. REV. 897, 898 (1999); Sheila K. Hyatt, The Remedies Gap: Com­
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Nevertheless, even courts recognizing the availability of com­
pensatory damages pursuant to § 1983 hesitate to actually award 
them. One court, in recognizing a compensatory damages remedy, 
characterized it as "extraordinary."269 Even the most widely cited 
case in support of this proposition, Matula, contains cautionary lan­
guage: "[I]n fashioning a remedy for an IDEA violation, a district 
court may wish to order educational services ... or reimbursement 
. . . rather than compensatory damages for generalized pain and 
suffering."27o The fact that there are no currently-reported cases 
where courts have actually granted "an award of retrospective, tort­
type damages" illustrates the extent of courts' hesitation to apply 
this remedy.271 
The hesitation displayed by these courts is understandable. As 
one court put it, "The Court is mindful that a damages remedy for 
IDEA violations will have significant policy implications."272 One 
of the more significant challenges that awarding damages would 
pose is the measurability of such damages, particularly when plain­
tiffs are seeking recovery for injuries such as emotional distress or 
pain and suffering.273 In his concurring opinion in Barnes, Justice 
Souter recognized this challenge: "I realize ... that the contract-law 
pensation and Implementation Under The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 
17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 689, 727 (1989-90) (suggesting that compensatory 
damages have a deterrent effect); Laura F. Rothstein, Special Education Malpractice 
Revisited, 43 Eouc. L. REp. 1249, 1262 (1988». 
269. Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11,30 (D.D.C. 2001) (stating 
that compensatory damages are an extraordinary remedy and suggesting a four part test 
for plaintiffs to prove that they are warranted). Under Walker, plaintiffs must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence: 1} that the district violated the IDEA; 2) that excep­
tional circumstances exist, such as that the conduct was persistently egregious and pre­
vented the plaintiff from securing equitable relief under IDEA; 3) that the municipality 
has a custom or practice that is the moving force behind the alleged IDEA violations 
(as is any § 1983 action); and 4} that the normal remedies offered under IDEA-specif­
ically compensatory education-are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the 
harm allegedly suffered. Id. at 53. 
270. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995). 
271. Seligmann, supra note 8, at 534 n.347 (stating that the issue has generally 
been considered at the dispositive motion stage or in the context of exhaustion). 
272. E.g., Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 
1296 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
273. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1998) (" ... IDEA 
lacks any particular standard by which a court could evaluate what amount of compen­
satory or punitive damages is appropriate. . .. Absent any such standards, the range of 
possible monetary awards would be vast ...."). But see Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 
1296 (arguing that the definition of "appropriate education" in Bd. of Educ. of Hen­
drick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,201 (1982) addresses the 
concern that IDEA lacks any definitive standards by which to evaluate an appropriate 
compensatory damages award). 
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analogy may fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other ques­
tions that may be raised by actions for private recovery under 
Spending Clause legislation, such as the proper measure of compen­
satory damages." 274 This unresolved issue, coupled with the open 
question as to whether a suit can be brought in the first place, will 
likely result in increased litigation on this issue.275 
Although the supposed "explosion" in education litigation 
reached a "plateau" in the 1980s, special education litigation re­
mains a notable exception to this trend.276 It has experienced dra­
matic growth over the last few decades. While the rate of growth 
has declined, the overall numbers have yet to recede.277 In addi­
tion, the group of students covered by IDEA continues to increase 
significantly. In the past decade, the number grew from approxi­
mately 4.3 million in 1990-91 to 5.6 million in 1999-00.278 This rep­
resents an increase of- 30%. In contrast, the growth in the 
population of school age children was roughly 10%, while the 
growth in school enrollment was only 14%.279 
At the same time, although Congress has authority under 
IDEA to provide up to 40% of the national average per pupil ex­
penditure to assist in educating students with disabilities, recent 
data indicates that the federal government provides only 12%.280 
Generally, states contribute 50-60% of the funding and local gov­
ernments contribute the remaining 30-40%.281 IDEA funding is 
simply not adequate for state and local governments to carry out 
their responsibilities to educate the growing number of children 
with disabilities.282 Furthermore, significant demands will be 
274. Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring). 
275. E.g., Candice Sang-Jasey & Linda D. Headley, Attorney's Fees and Damages 
in Special Education Cases, 212-Dec N.J. LAW. 38, 40 (December 2001) ("Those fami­
lies interested in pursuing monetary damages should strongly consider invoking all of 
the civil rights statutes mentioned earlier. This is an extremely volatile field of law now, 
with remedies appearing and disappearing on a regular basis."). 
276. Perry A. Zirkel, The "Explosion" In Education Litigation: An Update, 114 
EDUC. L. REP. 341, 349 (1997). 
277. Id. 
278. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTY-TIlIRD ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS ON 
TIlE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT II-21 
(2001), available at http://www.ed.gov'/offices/OSERS/OSEP/Research. 
279. Id. 
280. See supra note 82; Joetta L. Sack, Schools Grapple with Reality ofAmbitious 
Law, EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 6, 2000. 
281. For example, in Connecticut, the "local districts pay for roughly $40,000­
$50,000 of a student's annual cost, and the state pays for the rest." Costly Special Edu­
cation Services, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 11, 2001. 
282. Sack, supra note 280. See generally Bridget Flanagan & Chand J. Graff, Fed­
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placed on schools in the months ahead as Congress has just 
reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965,283 through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. The $26.5 
billion that Congress authorized for the 2002 fiscal year alone will 
minimize the chance of any additional funding for IDEA.284 In 
fact, "[t]he Administration opposes any proposal for mandatory 
IDEA funding within the context of the ESEA reauthorization."285 
In the end, it is a matter of weighing competing interests. On 
the one hand, permitting damages suits against schools for failing to 
provide students with the services they deserve may have a deter­
rent effect, serving to strengthen compliance with IDEA. On the 
other hand, there will undoubtedly be a cost to the system in doing 
so,286 especially in light of courts' apparent uncertainty concerning 
how to fashion an appropriate compensatory damages award in the 
IDEA context. Inadequate funds and increasing demands are stark 
realities for the schools that serve our children. Opening the door 
to further litigation in special education will not improve an already 
difficult situation.287 
CONCLUSION 
Special education cases frequently involve multiple defendants 
and various substantive claims. Students with disabilities often sue 
under § 504 and the ADA, as well as constitutional and state tort 
law. IDEA, with its extensive rights and due process provisions, 
eral Mandate to Educate Disabled Students Doesn't Cover Costs, FED. LAW., Sept. 2000, 
at 23 ("The public would be even more surprised-and dismayed-to learn that federal 
and state lawmakers have not seen fit to fully fund these services ...."). 
283. Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). 
284. Congress Passes Sweeping Education Law, NEA TODAY (Nat'I Educ. 
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Mass. 1999) (stating that the Supreme Court, "[w]hile ... reject[ing] a 'cost-based stan­
dard as the sole test for determining the scope' of the IDEA, ... [does] recognize that 
'the potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to ar­
riving at a sensible construction of the IDEA'" (citing Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 73 (1991»). 
287. See, e.g., Flanagan & Graff, supra note 282 at 27 ("Unfortunately, instead of 
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generally serves as the primary basis for these suits. Because IDEA 
specifies rights, but not remedies, courts have developed remedies 
over time, including compensatory education and reimbursement 
for tuition and related services. Litigation at the forefront, how­
ever, seeks monetary damages for harm such as pain and suffering 
or economic injury. Since these damages remain largely unavaila­
ble, especially under § 1415(i)'s appropriate relief language, parents 
frequently seek them pursuant to § 1983. Given the lack of clarity 
with respect to the proper interpretation of § 1415(1), it is not sur­
prising that courts have split on whether compensatory damages are 
allowed under § 1983. This confusion is only heightened by the Su­
preme Court's refusal to hear this issue and Congressional failure to 
take action to clarify the situation.288 
A proper interpretation of § 1415(1) supports the conclusion 
that it does not clearly authorize § 1983 compensatory damages 
awards. Even assuming their availability under the Franklin pre­
sumption does not necessarily make compensatory damages appro­
priate. In the final analysis, although allowing compensatory 
damages awards under § 1983 may deter intentional violations of 
IDEA, it will come at great expense to school districts and the chil­
dren that IDEA intends to serve. 
Rebecca L. Bouchard 
288. See, e.g., Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Can Section 1983 Be Used To Redress Viola­
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